For most of their careers Messi, Higuaín, Di Maria, and
Aguero have been offensive cornerstones for their respective teams. Powerful European sides like Barcelona, Real
Madrid, and Manchester City play a brand of football that privileges possession
of the ball, control of the flow of the game, and, above all, the generation of
multiple and repeated goal scoring opportunities.
While Argentina is undefeated
with Messi, Aguero, Higuaín, and Di Maria on the field, those approaches have
little to do with Sabella’s team. Since he took over the national team in
2011 following the abject failure of Sergio ‘Checho’ Batista’s team in the 2011
Copa America—a team which, incidentally, tried to play possession football but
was eliminated on home soil by Uruguay in the quarterfinals—Sabella’s principal
tactical quandary has centered on finding a way to reconcile his usually
conservative, cautious, and generally defensive approach with the skill set and
talents of the ‘fantastic four.’ A speculator’s speculator, Sabella’s teams
have always approached the game from the defensive back line to a front. The
Estudiantes de La Plata he coached to the Copa Libertadores Championship was a
defensive minded team that mired opponents with the strength its midfield,
playing up to three defensive central midfielders (the position typically
referred to as a number 5 or volante central in Argentina). His greatest tactical achievement came
in the final of the World Club Cup in 2009, where his Estudiantes challenged the
best version of Pep Guardiola’s Barcelona to the brink of elimination in
regular time and, had it not been for a brilliant goal by Messi at the end of
extra time, would have likely taken the game into a penalty shootout.
Coaching Argentina, the best outcomes for
Sabella’s team in qualifying and in international friendlies have unsurprisingly come in games featuring
the ‘fantastic four.’ The spectacular offensive names on Argentina's starting
eleven, however, belie the essence of Sabella's team. The best version of
Argentina is a team that is built on the counterattacking speed and prowess of
the ‘fantastic four.’ The first time the four played together the outcome was a
4-0 rout of Ecuador in a World Cup Qualifier. All four goals were generated
from transitional counterattacking opportunities. In a spectacular 4-3 friendly
win against Brazil in New Jersey, a game that included a hat trick performance
by Messi, three of the four goals came via counterattack. After benefiting from
a Kedhira own-goal off a set piece, Messi and Di Maria scored in counterattacks
in a 3-1 friendly win in Frankfurt against Germany. Against teams that try to
attack and play possession football, Argentina generally plays better and wins.
Against stingier teams that cede the ball and sacrifice field position in favor of placing many players in their defensive
area, the team suffers and struggles to score.
The team’s 2014 World Cup
campaign mirrors that pattern. Against defensive minded teams
(Bosnia-Herzegovina and Iran) the team played lackluster football and struggled
to generate opportunities only to be
bailed out by Messi’s last minute goals. In the
knockout stage, they struggled to score against Switzerland and Belgium with
possession. Once again Argentina were only able to generate offense in
transitional and counterattacking possessions after their opponents pushed into the attacking half and tried to assert their offensive play.The countering speed and power of the albiceleste obscures its inability to generate its own offense and its utter dependence on the opponent’s field position. Even more to the point, counterattacking brilliance from the ‘fantastic four’ covers up the most significant weaknesses of a team built on a relatively shaky defensive foundation, starting with Sergio Romero’s haphazard goalkeeping and the constant doubts of the back four. In semis of this World Cup, Sabella is up against his worst nightmare in the Netherlands, another team that loves to counterattack with speed. The outcome of that game will likely be decided by the fate of whichever team is put on the back foot first. Even with the substantial loss of Di Maria, if Argentina can force the Netherlands into an offensive position, Sabella's team will likely be in the WC Final on July 13.