US Soccer: Good thing these guys don't do healthcare

What? You say you have been diagnosed skin cancer? OK, US Soccer will just slap this colorful bandage on it (it is made in Germany after all...). Is it going to cure the cancer below? No, but it looks good in the mean time and it provides the appearance of some sort of remedy to your ailment. Good thing these guys aren't doctors...


US Soccer's recent hire of Jurgen Klinsmann is a short sided and very temporary solution to a set of complex long range problems that have little to do with the national (men's) team and lots to do with a structure that does not fully take advantage of available talent and, more importantly, lacks a cohesive and coherent identity in terms of style and does not have an effective vertical organization across FIFA's varying age categories. Klinsmann will likely build a decent team (probably one that is very defensive and stingy), he should probably qualify without any problem to the 2014 World Cup, and he may even pull off a major coup by upsetting Mexico at home. If he were to accomplish all of that it would be something, but it is nowhere near the true capacity of US (men's) soccer. In fact, even with all of those as certain accomplishment, they might all add up to a step back rather than finally taking the decisive step forward US Soccer has been on the cusp of for what seems like an eternity. 

Altidore and Adu in 2007

I emphasize that this is all applicable to the men's team because the US Women are on a different path altogether. Unlike the men's utter failure in recent years, the US Women's teams have a definite identity and have been able to push players through the Under-18 and Under-19 teams, to a much greater degree than the men's squad. The top players on the women's side are all veterans of the Under-18 and Under-19 teams: Hope Solo,  Rachel Buehler, Amy Rodriguez, Megan Rapinoe, Heather O'Reilly to name a few played on at least one Under- team (and sometimes more than one) on their way to making the national side. In contrast, the Men's efforts at cultivating youth up into the ranks of the senior team have been disastrous. The Under-17 team is currently headed by former Colombian international Wilmer Cabrera has not fared well in international competition and, , save for a few support players, neither Cabrera or his predecessor (John Hackworth) can claim successes that match those of the women's national team. The Under-20 team, now with a head coaching vacancy, has not fared any better in terms of advancing in international competition despite performing well in the opening rounds of a few recent Under-20 World Cups. Michael Bradley, Jozy Altidore and Freddy Adu are recent successes for the US Under-20 team (all on the 2007 World Cup team that made it to the quarter finals) but not there's not much else of significance after that tournament. To make matters worse, the Under-20 team recently failed to qualify, losing to Guatemala, a first time qualifier to the Under-20 World Cup.


The US does not need a glamarous head coach. Whatever shortcomings Bob Bradley demonstrated in his tenure as head coach (and they were many) and in whatever way Klinsmann's pedigree and (limited) head coaching experience can overcome those limitations, there are deeper problems that will continue because they are structural and philosophical across all of US Soccer. Structural because the approach of treating the men's Under-17 and Under-20 as something separate from each other and as something altogether distinct than the senior squad has resulted in an abject failure to construct a "feeder" system that builds on experiences gained in the younger divisions (hence the lack of carryover in terms of personnel). Philosophical because Cabrera's Under-17 plays one style of football and the Under-20 (at least in its latest iteration under Thomas Rongen) played an almost diametrically opposed style that relied on completely different types of footballers (Rongen's teams were much more defensive and physical, Cabrera's tend to try to rely on more talented players at the expense of physicality). The US needs an identity, a style of play that suits the idiosyncracy of the US game: defensive? offensive? It almost doesn't matter what the choice is but there needs to be a clear and definite choice that informs what is done across all competitions and age levels because, in the long term,  it will provide what successful national teams have, a football identity that serves as a center of gravity which provides a useful reference point for players and coaches. Senior team head coaches should be hired because they have a long term project for the senior team as well as for the Under-17 and -20 side and because they can form a coaching staff that handles not only the senior side but the younger squads as well. For international powerhouses like Brazil, Germany, England, Argentina, Italy, Spain, or France, the process of developing that center of gravity has been a prolonged historical experience, often marked by a significant degree of back and forth, tensions, massive disputes and years of failures. Unlike societies where football is a part of social and cultural life since the nineteenth century, the US has the potentially enormous advantage of being able to choose a path and institute it. Swapping Klinsmann in for Bradley has little to do with making that choice. If the head coach fails then the coaches for the younger squads should replaced along with him as a way of keeping all three national teams in synchronicity and maintaining coherence in terms of a national scale project. Until the leadership decides on something and implements it in a coherent way across its national teams, the US might be on its own century long identity search. 

Migration and Muscles: A new common sense?

For decades the relationship between migration and musculature was clear for Europe-bound Latin American footballers: more is better. Regardless of talent, the more muscle the higher the odds of finding a place on a top dollar European side. Until recently it was common wisdom, almost reflexive in nature. In a 2001 interview Diego Maradona was asked his opinion on the possible migration of Pablo Aimar and Javier Saviola. His response was quick and to the point. I'm paraphrasing but it was something in the order of: "if they want to succeed in Europe, they better start going to the gym." 

Making reference to the old adage that European football tends to privilege less talented players who can tolerate the physical rigors of the game over those with more talent but less 'body' and bulk, Maradona's comments seem out of touch in today's context. The arrival of Alexis Sanchez to Barcelona FC this season highlights this apparent shift away from so much emphasis on physical strength. After a successful stint at River Plate in Argentina and at Udinese for the last three seasons, all relevant questions about Sanchez's game  point to pretty much any place except his body. Can he adapt to Barça's pressing and passing? Is he willing to put up with bench time? Where will he play if Messi owns Barça's right flank? The questions go on and on--some are very relevant given Sanchez's distinct style and game--but none of the important questions seem to reference Sanchez's 'durability', a code word all too often used to comment on a player's size and strength. 


Part of the reason for this apparent shift lies in Barça's high output offense which relies heavily on very talented players but even more so on a cohesive effort to apply high pressure defense and recover the football as quickly as possible. During this week's Audi cup games Barça coach Pep Guardiola started teams that featured stars but also young players from La Masia, Barça's youth academy. During the games he practically swapped out the entire starting eleven and introduced a mixed set of players to replace the starters. Guardiola balanced the spectacle by carefully shuttling stars in and out and when Iniesta left the game, David Villa entered the game. What was interesting to watch was the way in which the seemingly endless stream of substitutes did not at all distract from the style imposed by Barça. Even more than that it was also significant to note the diminutive stature of almost all the La Masia products making their debut at the Allianz Arena. It is not only a privileging of a particular style of play but also an appreciation of talent, technique, and collective play over brawn and muscle. 


The questions around the arrival of Sanchez should be about this style of play and not much else beyond that because that is what matters at Barça at the moment. Whether this can become a lasting trend remains to be seen and depends, unfortunately, much more on the quality of the refereeing than anything else. For the time being, and as long as referees protect players in the spirit of FIFA's vaunted Fair Play, it will continue. 

The crisis of Argentine football

AFA president Julio Grondona

A few days ago the Argentine Football Association announced that, as of the 2012 season, it would merge its first and second division tournaments in order to create a 'super' tournament of 40 teams. The move comes in the aftermath of a complicated juncture for the AFA which includes the utter failure of the national team in this year's Copa America and the descent of River Plate--one of the countries most popular football teams--to the second division. Yesterday, in a press conference on the announcement of the outline for the restructuring of Argentine football, official AFA spokesperson Ernesto Cherquis Bialo confirmed what many suspected as the rumor mill began to churn out more details on the changes to come:  "if River Plate had not descended, this would not have been decided." (See link) While the move to reinstate River Plate to the first division was fairly transparent, the restructuring of the tournament also potentially masked other major problems for the AFA:

• River Plate is not the only popular team currently in the second division (though it is by far the one with the most titles and largest following). The recent demotion of Gimnasia y Esgrima (La Plata), Huracan, and Rosario Central along with possible relegation problems to come for other important teams (Racing, Boca Juniors, and San Lorenzo) jeopardizes the AFA's ability to coninue to generate revenue through the host of 'clasicos' that in many ways define Argentine football. With River Plate, Gimnasia y Esgrima, Huracan, and Rosario Central mired in the second division, the AFA's 2011-12 season will be without three of its most 'clasicos': the so-called "super" clasico between River Plate and Boca Juniors, the Newell's Old Boys-Rosario Central derby in Rosario, and the La Plata derby between Estudiantes and  Gimnasia y Esgrima. Thus the 40 team tournament offered the promise of replentished coffers for the AFA
•  A more significant though less discussed issue is a massive pending lawsuit against the AFA for (essentially) break of contract on behalf of TyC Sports. The absolute owners of Argentine football throughout the 1990s, TyC lost its contract for exclusive broadcast rights for first division games last year to the incentive promoted and backed by the national government headed by president Cristina Kirchner. Futbol Para Todos (the broadcasting of all first division games over the public airwaves) is at the core of a suit brought by TyC in the amount of (approximately) 300 million dollars for the breach of the contract the company had with the AFA until 2014. (See link)

"Todo Pasa"

The AFA's looming financial problems and the potential solutions offered by the 40 team tournament notwithstanding, the plan has been met by relentless popular opposition in Argentina and a range of mobilizations to the AFA's headquarters is being organized through social media. In light of the popular opposition, Julio Grondona, president of the AFA, has called a press conference for today and is expected to shelf the project for 'further study.' Yet Grondona's move might prove to be too little and too late and after 34 years in power he may have to show himself the door as a result of the failure to not only deal with the controversy surrounding the 40 team tournament but also yet another early exit by the national team early exit from this year's Copa America. The largest unresolved problem for the AFA is the common perception of massive corruption (and in 99% of cases the actuality of corruption and personal dealings) and Grondona might have run out scapegoats to push down the proverbial pirate plank Grondona is known for wearing a ring with the legend "Todo Pasa," something which can be loosely translated into "Everything Happens." It can also be understood a much more direct way of saying “anything goes" and a statement to Grondona's durability if taken to mean a much more literal "Everything goes by." In his thirty four years of rule at the AFA he has survived ten changes of national governments, including the de facto presidency by the military junta of the late 1970s during which he ascended to the throne of the AFA. If Grondona's "Everything goes by" is correct and no crisis is truly insurmountable, Grondona might continue. 

Bielsa and Athletic Bilbao

Marcelo Bielsa's arrival at Athletic Bilbao has the potential to remake La Liga. His team may not win right away, or at least they might not be ready to take on the two historic top flight teams (Barcelona and Real Madrid) but his presence will mean the opening of a third position in the ideological and practical battle that Jose Mourinho and Josep (Pep) Guardiola have been waging, both in the open through their sometimes quite hostile back and forth, and more consistently in the tactical staging of their many confrontations on the field in last season's tournaments.

Now, it is clear that this is football and coaches (and their projects) can get canned in a minute but assuming he is given room and time to develop his vision for Athletic Bilbao, the opportunities to craft a third option will likely develop. Although he just took over at Athletic there are already is a small sampling of what is to come. In a press conference last week Bielsa refreshed his key concepts for the Spanish press: his teams seek "to become protagonists rather than to speculate, to establish presence in the opponent's half and not in our own, to value ball possession before ball recovery, and to promote the use of the rule book as a recourse to improve the game rather than a separate way to gain advantage." (The translation is loose but it carries the meaning of the original phrases). These precepts would seem to place him squarely in Guardiola's corner and against Mourinhos willingness to sacrifice aesthetics (and history and pretty much anything else) for the sake of winning. Yet Bielsa's teams have never played like Guardiola's, not even in 2004 when, between Argentina's Olympic gold in Athens and the teams superb performance in that year's Copa America (played in Peru), the team played its best football (despite the defeat in the Copa America final).

Despite the apparent similarities (at least rhetorically), Bielsa's posture and approach is different from Guardiola's. If not in intent--both are clearly offensive minded--they differ in the possibilities that their styles offer. The more direct, vertical, and downhill play favored by Bielsa differs from Barcelona's flowing style on an obvious aesthetic level. Leaving aside the presence of Barcelona's three greats--Iniesta, Xavi, and Messi--Bielsa's teams are much more structured and rigorous in their forging of clear positions within which players play a definitive role (and when they don't, or don't do so at a high enough level, they are substituted for another who attempts to play that same role). Because his style is much more schematic and programmatic, Bielsa could potentially transport his approach to other teams, large or small, powerful or weak--that's what observers typically praised in his Chilean side, the willingness to take a relatively weak and small Chilean national team and play them in a big offensive manner. Whether Guardiola's approach can travel remains to be seen but on game days when one of the big three is not on the field, one gets the sense that it would be much harder to carry it elsewhere.

This is not a minor point and it represents a potential important interruption in the decades long binary battle between Barcelona and Real Madrid that characterizes La Liga. Bielsa's arrival offers the possibility of openning a third position which, if successful, might offer a potential point of departure that would give the smaller, weaker Spanish teams another option beyond massively defensive schemes that merely seek to speculate.

why the women's world cup is a better game

this year's women's world cup in germany has made clear everything that has been cut out, forcibly removed, and exorcised by the forces of evil from the men's game:

1) offensive play: women's football is more tactically honest and faithful to the organizing principles of the game. the tactical disposition of women's world cup games are almost completely devoid of the sort of perverse speculation that utterly dominates the men's game and pretty much all the teams--even the less talented teams--play an associative style

2) strength: the scale of the field in relation to the physical strength of the players means that there are much more opportunities for playing into space, something which has--on the back of stingy and unethical coaching and the priveligening of musculature and marathoning skills--all but disappeared from the men's game. in the men's game, physicality and physical play typically carry such a premium that teams more often than not aim and strategize to play through the body of the opposition rather than into the space behind him or to his side.

3) teamwork and stars: standout players in the women's world cup are the sort of players that used to dominate the men's game prior to the era of multimedia and hyperglobalized television. marta, christiane, sonia bompastor, aya miyama, kelly smith, and homare sawa are all central figures on their teams not only for their own finishing and goal scoring prowess but also for their ability to set up teammates with precise passing.

overly defensive strategies crafted by would-be tactic wizards and hyper glamourized superstar strikers (with superstar egos) have been slowly but surely strangling (men's) football's creativity and appeal for decades. this year's Copa America quarterfinals are telling: stingy defensive and speculative teams displaced more offensive counterparts in every bracket leaving the weakest field in terms of on the ball talent in years. rather than emulating barcelona's (and spain's) example and favoring offensive football and privileging of talent over physical prowess, the world of (male) football has taken the lesson that more muscle, more senseless and endless running, and more air tight defensive strategies. maybe if they watched a bit of the women's world cup...