A speculator's speculator: Sabella and the trees that block the view of the forest

For most of their careers Messi, Higuaín, Di Maria, and Aguero have been offensive cornerstones for their respective teams.  Powerful European sides like Barcelona, Real Madrid, and Manchester City play a brand of football that privileges possession of the ball, control of the flow of the game, and, above all, the generation of multiple and repeated goal scoring opportunities. 

While Argentina is undefeated with Messi, Aguero, Higuaín, and Di Maria on the field, those approaches have little to do with Sabella’s team. Since he took over the national team in 2011 following the abject failure of Sergio ‘Checho’ Batista’s team in the 2011 Copa America—a team which, incidentally, tried to play possession football but was eliminated on home soil by Uruguay in the quarterfinals—Sabella’s principal tactical quandary has centered on finding a way to reconcile his usually conservative, cautious, and generally defensive approach with the skill set and talents of the ‘fantastic four.’ A speculator’s speculator, Sabella’s teams have always approached the game from the defensive back line to a front. The Estudiantes de La Plata he coached to the Copa Libertadores Championship was a defensive minded team that mired opponents with the strength its midfield, playing up to three defensive central midfielders (the position typically referred to as a number 5 or volante central in Argentina). His greatest tactical achievement came in the final of the World Club Cup in 2009, where his Estudiantes challenged the best version of Pep Guardiola’s Barcelona to the brink of elimination in regular time and, had it not been for a brilliant goal by Messi at the end of extra time, would have likely taken the game into a penalty shootout.  

Coaching Argentina, the best outcomes for Sabella’s team in qualifying and in international friendlies have unsurprisingly come in games featuring the ‘fantastic four.’ The spectacular offensive names on Argentina's starting eleven, however, belie the essence of Sabella's team. The best version of Argentina is a team that is built on the counterattacking speed and prowess of the ‘fantastic four.’ The first time the four played together the outcome was a 4-0 rout of Ecuador in a World Cup Qualifier. All four goals were generated from transitional counterattacking opportunities. In a spectacular 4-3 friendly win against Brazil in New Jersey, a game that included a hat trick performance by Messi, three of the four goals came via counterattack. After benefiting from a Kedhira own-goal off a set piece, Messi and Di Maria scored in counterattacks in a 3-1 friendly win in Frankfurt against Germany. Against teams that try to attack and play possession football, Argentina generally plays better and wins. Against stingier teams that cede the ball and sacrifice field position in favor of placing many players in their defensive area, the team suffers and struggles to score.

The team’s 2014 World Cup campaign mirrors that pattern. Against defensive minded teams (Bosnia-Herzegovina and Iran) the team played lackluster football and struggled to generate opportunities only to be

bailed out by Messi’s last minute goals. In the knockout stage, they struggled to score against Switzerland and Belgium with possession. Once again Argentina were only able to generate offense in transitional and counterattacking possessions after their opponents pushed into the attacking half and tried to assert their offensive play.

The countering speed and power of the albiceleste obscures its inability to generate its own offense and its utter dependence on the opponent’s field position. Even more to the point, counterattacking brilliance from the ‘fantastic four’ covers up the most significant weaknesses of a team built on a relatively shaky defensive foundation, starting with Sergio Romero’s haphazard goalkeeping and the constant doubts of the back four. In semis of this World Cup, Sabella is up against his worst nightmare in the Netherlands, another team that loves to counterattack with speed. The outcome of that game will likely be decided by the fate of whichever team is put on the back foot first. Even with the substantial loss of Di Maria, if Argentina can force the Netherlands into an offensive position, Sabella's team will likely be in the WC Final on July 13.